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The outstanding quality in John Howland's mind was in-
tegrity. He thought slowly, even painfully, assimilating his
experience almost inch by inch. What he learned from it be-
came an essential part of himself. He was one of those men
who find themselves late and are almost compelled to force
themselves to look at life. But in the process of self-discovery
there developed in him an awareness of purpose, a resolution,
and a courage that made certain for him a career of real dis-
tinction. For he had the type of character that never deserts
an objective that it is determined to gain. He wrestled with his
difficulties like a swimmer who battles with a heavy sea; but,
when they were overcome, their defeat came to mean for him
a mastery and definition of ends which gave him an inner
assurance certainly destined to make him a man of significance.
His early death was more than a loss to us who cared for him.
It deprived the law of one who had come to see in its ser-
vice the opportunity of a public devotion which illuminated his
whole life. This paper is but a fragment of the purpose he had
shaped for himself. It is yet, his friends believe, sufficient in
its penetration and care, to make it clear why those who loved
him recognized in his personality a promise destined to a high
fulfilment.
HAROLD J. LASKI
THE INSTITUTION of reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy
Act invariably precipitates a conflict between secured creditors on the
one hand, and the debtor, its stockholders and subordinate creditors on
t John Howland was an attorney in the Railroad Division of the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation. He died in December, 1935. This paper was found among the
author's personal effects. Cases in support of his position which were decided since his
death have been added.
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the other. Secured creditors desire to convert their collateral into cash
at the earliest opportunity consistent with a maximum return on their
investment; while the other interests prefer to maintain the collateral
in staiu quo, in the hope that the security will eventually be included in
the property of the reorganized company. This latter purpose can be
achieved only by enjoining the secured creditors from enforcing their
claims, on the authority of the Rock Island case.' To the unwilling
secured creditor this infringement of contract rights causes grave con-
cern." but to the other interests lostponement represents a fair measure
necessary to the success of the cooperative effort to reorganize. These
conflicting desires must be reconciled by the reorganization courts with
ncgligible assistance from the decided cases, for the applicable rules are
still being formulated. In order to obtain some practical basis for these
rules it is nccc-;sarv to understand fully the effects of an order restraining
secured creditors upon the business of banking and finance, and the
practice of corp crate reorganizations.
T.
For the purposes of this study, a primary distinction should be made
betveen long and short term debts. A long term debt of a railroad or
industrial corporation is usually evidenced by a bond or other instrument
s-cured by a mortgage or deed of trust covering specific physical property;
a short term debt, on the other hand, is generally evidenced by a col-
lateral note or trust bond secured by a pledge of specific securities owned
by he debtor.' Although the difference in the form of the security device
is not without legal import, the significance of the discrimination lies in
the diversity in comnercial function between long and short term secured
credits and in the degree of liquidity of the collateral securing the debts.
Long term l)orrowing has become the recognized and orthodox method
of obtaining capital for industrial development.4 This form of borrow-
ing is characterized by the ultimate security of the collateral rather than
1. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U. S.
648 (1935), (1935) 48 HARv. L. REV. 1430, (1935) 30 IL.. L. REv. 240, (1935) 83 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 913; Comment (1935) 33 Mic. L. REV. 1225.
2. See Paton, Collateral as Affected by the Borrower's Bankruptcy (1931) 24 A.xt.
BANKERS A. J. 125.
3. Although the pledge device is typically associated with that form of financing,
it is not necessarily restricted to short term credits; collateral trust bonds may be se-
cured by a pledge of securities or other choses in action, and in the guaranteed mort-
gage field it was common to issue bonds secured by a pledge of mortgages. Cf. In re
Prudence Bonds Corp., 75 F. (2d) 262, 263 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
4. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1934) 82-97, 931-53, esp.
at 940. The policy of issuing short term obligations in anticipation of the issue of long
term bonds, on the assumption that interest rates are declining, is of comparatively
recent origin; it is based similarly on the principle of liquidity.
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by immediate liquidity. Experience has demonstrated that even in the
absence of judicial restraint the collateral securing a long term debt
cannot ordinarily be reduced to cash. Theoretically the bondholder or
his representative has the power to foreclose and sell the collateral upon
default and to apply the proceeds toward the payment of principal
or interest. In practice, however, this power rarely- if ever- can
result in the conversion of collateral into cash. The size and complexity
of modem industrial enterprise make real liquidation of large mortgage
debts impossible; an independent buyer who is prepared to pay a fair
price can seldom be found in times of economic stress, and consequently
a forced sale would be ruinous to creditors and debtors alike. For these
reasons foreclosures of railroad or industrial mortgages have not resulted
in sales in the ordinary business sense, but in reorganizations.' Briefly.
the procedure is that mortgage assets are bid in at a nominal price by
a representative of the bondholders, and the property is transferred to
a new company in which the bondholders receive in exchange for the
old bonds a fractional interest as provided by the plan of reorganiza-
tion.' After the payment of all the foreclosure expenses from the small
amount realized from the sale, whatever cash remains is made available
to dissenters exclusively. These well-known infirmities, immanent in
collateral securing long term obligations, apparently have never presented
any serious impediment to the sale of long term bonds. Nor, presumably,
where the debtor is undergoing reorganization pursuant to Section 77
or Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, will a restraint of the right of
foreclosure have a disturbing effect on the long term money market.
The situation in the case of short term credits, however, is directly
the contrary.7 Short term credits are usually provided by commercial
banks, by investment bankers or others interested in the preservation of
the debtor corporation, and, in some cases, by government agencies or
by the public through its subscription to issues of short term notes.
These short term credits owe their existence to the exigencies of tempor-
ary financing; they constitute a type of emergency security which comes
5. See Craven and Fuller, The z935 Aiendments o~f the Railroad Bankruptcy
Law (1936) 49 HARv. L. RE%. 1254, 1269; Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some
Aspects of Corporate Rcorqani:ations (1933) 19 V.%. L. Rz,. 541, 554; 1 GLanzs, Con-
PORATE R EORGANIZATIONS (1936) 110.
6. In cases where the mortgage is owned by a single creditor the problem is not
quite so complex, but liquidation of the security i; rarely attained. The mortgagee will
usually buy in the property, in many instances only after a protracted and expensive
foreclosure proceeding, and he kvill probably be required to hold the property indefin-
itely for a rise in the market. See Oppenheim, Sales of Property in Bankruptcy (1934)
29 ILL. L. Rmv. 67.
7. On the subject of short term financing see DEwING, op. cit. supra note 4, at
937; Hatch, A Form of Depression Finance-Corporations Pledqing Their Own Bonds
(1934) 47 HAnv. L. REv. 1093.
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into popular use during periods of acute economic depression.8  Rail-
roads and industries unable to meet fixed charges and operating expenses
must resort to borrowing in order to escape the waste and expense inci-
dent to bankruptcy or reorganization.' But at these times the stringent
money market makes it impossible to borrow long term funds by the sale
of bonds at reasonable rates in the open market.10 It becomes essential,
therefore, to borrow from the banker on short term paper secured by col-
lateral of a more fluid nature. Demand for collateral is particularly appar-
ent in periods of banking difficulties, when the volume of frozen bank
loans is mounting in proportion to threatened extraordinary demands by
depositors. In the usual case, the collateral will consist chiefly of securities
owned by the debtor, including securities of the debtor or its affiliated
companies." Liquidity is insured by the terms of pledge agreements,
which ordinarily provide that collateral may be sold by the pledgee im-
mediately upon default. In actual practice this ideal * rapid conversion
of collateral into cash - is not always attained in cases involving sales
of a considerable amount of collateral. In these instances collateral is
frequently bought in by the creditor who may dispose of the securities
on the open market from time to time.' 2  Despite the imperfections of
the pledge device in that regard, however, this characteristic - liquidity
-is so fundamental that any restriction upon the exercise of the power
of sale results in serious apprehension in banking circles and brings forth
the prediction that short term credit may not be available in the future.13
As one court said, "Nothing would be more disturbing to transactions
of that kind . . . ,,14
Prior to the adoption of Sections 77 and 77B of the Bankruptcy Act,
the distinction between long and short term credit was recognized by
8. DEwiNG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 939.
9. In the single year 1932, the railroads issued over $1,000,000,000 in mortgage
bonds; the bulk of these bonds were issued as collateral securing short term loans of
approximately $650,000,000. U. S. Daily, Jan. 18, 1933, p. 2005, col. 4. An examination
of the Interstate Commerce Commission finance dockets covering approvals of Recon-
struction Finance Corporation loans indicates that probably 90% of the issues were
typical of the kind under discussion. E.g., Chicago & N. W. Ry., 180 I. C. C. 533
(1932) ; Missouri Pac. R. R., 184 I. C. C. 3 (1932); New York Cent. R. R., 184 1. C. C.
737 (1932) ; Southern Ry., 187 I. C. C. 331 (1932) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 187 I. C. C.
323 (1932).
10. DEwINa, op. cit. supra note 4, at 940, n. e., 941, n. f.
11. On the pledge of the debtor's own bonds see Hatch, loc. cit. supra note 7.
12. E.g., collateral held by short term bank creditors of Insull Utilities, Inc., was
bought in by the creditors when sold pursuant to the pledge agreement in August, 1935.
See STANDARD BOND DEsc upTioNs, Bond Bulletin Section, p. 1146 (1937).
13. See McGinnis, The Sale of Collateral Security by the Pledgee Thereof After
the Intervention of the Bankruptcy of the Pledgor (1934) 9 IND. L. J. 195, 219; Paton,
loc. cit. supra note 2. And see note 43, infra.
14. In re Hudson River Navigation Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175, 176 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
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bankruptcy and reorganization courts, though in most cases not for the
reasons here presented. In bankruptcy it was generally held that the
court had jurisdiction to enjoin the foreclosure of a mortgage'G if the
necessary conditions were present 16 but had no jurisdiction to forbid
the sale of pledged securities in accordance with the terms of the pledge
contract. 7 A similar rule prevailed in equity reorganization practice.'8
Since the pledge contract is characteristic of short term financing, the
rule against restraining foreclosure sales in effect recognized tile differ-
ence between long and short term credits in the need for liquidity. But,
except for isolated cases 9 the distinction between foreclosure of mort-
gages and pledges was placed not upon that ground, but upon the theory
that summary bankruptcy power depended upon actual or constructive
possession of the assets by the debtor at the time of the petition.0  That
the distinction is legalistic rather than functional is apparent from state-
ments that the sale of pledged property could not be enjoined even in
15. See Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734, 738 (1931); Straton V.
New, 283 U. S. 318, 321 (1931) ; Comment (1932) 41 Y.LE L J. 445.
16. A sale of mortgaged property was enjoined in bankruptcy only if there was
an actual or potential equity in the property which would be sacrificed by a foreclosure
sale. In re Morris White Holding Co., 52 F. (2d) 499 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); see Central
States Life Ins. Co. v. Koplar, 80 F. (2d) 754, 757 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); cf. Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 584 (1935); In re Schulte United,
Inc., 49 F. (2d) 264 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
17. Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 (1876) ; Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 23
(1907); In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). Contra:
In re Henry, 50 F. (2d) 453 (E. D. Pa. 1931). But see criticism of the decision in
Paton, supra note 2, at 126. A permanent restraint against the sale of collateral has
been issued where the collateral consisted of unsecured obligations of the debtor. John
Matthews, Inc. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 192 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911).
18. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Galveston City R. R., 87 Fed. 813 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893);
International Banking Corp. v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 242 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Frank Waterhouse & Co., 279 Fed. 750 (W. D. Wash. 1922). Contra:
Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments, Inc., 58 F. (2d) 1022 (N. D. 11. 1932), rcld on
other grounds, sub nor:. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F. (2d) 329 (CC. A.
7th, 1932).
19. In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Rogers
Brown & Co. v. Tindell Morris Co., 271 Fed. 475 (E. D. Pa. 1921); In re Chalken,
M.. D. Pa. 1933, (1933) 10 Am. BANma. REv. 14. This functional approach is expressed
in In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., supra, at 176:
"Millions of dollars are daily lent upon like collateral, which fluctuates from hour
to hour; unless the pledgee is free to choose his time to sell, his security may disappar.
The same is not indeed true of shares like those at bar, or of notes, neither of which
vary rapidly in value; but the same legal reasons exist as to them also. The pledgee.
having taken possession of the documents, supposes himself for just that reason to be the
sole judge of his necessities, and lends on that understanding. So long as he keeps within
the terms of the agreement, he need not concern himself with the pledgor's fate, or that
of his creditors, who must stand in his shoes . .
20. See cases in notes 17 and 18, supra.
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cases where the pledge device had been used to secure long term debts. 1
Although based on principles of property rather than commercial prac-
tice, the discrimination in favor of pledge contracts as distinguished from
mortgage contracts undoubtedly afforded a desirable means of insuring
liquidity in short term financing. It is probably true that "business has
adapted its transactions to this line" 2 by using the pledge device in short
term loans. Thus, prior to the enactment of Sections 77 and 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act, business needs and legal concepts had attained a posi-
tion of approximate assimilation.
II.
From the creditor's point of view the enactment of Sections 77 and
77B of the Bankruptcy Act accentuated the desire for an unrestricted
right to foreclose, particularly in the case of short term debts. Under
these amendments it became possible for two-thirds of a class to bind
the remainder to any plan of reorganization23 found by the court24 to be
fair and equitable.2 As applied to long term creditors this provision is
not a radical innovation; it is merely an improved method of accom-
plishing the same result as the sale in an equity reorganization. 2 But,
as applied to short term creditors such as commercial banks, the pro-
vision carries a definite threat. A single short term creditor might be
compelled to accept a plan of reorganization which involved a drastic
change in his status, such as the surrender of all collateral in exchange
for stock. This was not the case in equity reorganizations. While the
plan must be found to be fair and equitable, the sharp change from
previous reorganization practice in this regard and the different concepts
of an impartial plan naturally breed distrust among short term creditors
and increase their desire to escape, if possible, from the threat of coer-
cion.27
21. See, e.g., In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 75 F. (2d) 262, 263 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
22. Rogers Brown & Co. v. Tindell Morris Co., 271 Fed. 475, 476 (E. D. Pa. 1921).
23. BANKRPTCY ACT § 77 (e). 49 STAT. 1969, 11 U. S. C. § 205 (e) (Supp. 1936);
§77 B (b), 48 STAT. 913, 11 U. S. C. § 207 (b) (1934).
24. In railroad reorganization the plan must be approved by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission [BAN RuPTcY ACT § 77 (d), 49 STAT. 917 (1935), 11 U. S. C.
§ 205 (d) (Supp. 1936)] as well as by the court [BANKRUPTCY ACT § 77 (e), 49 STAT.
1969, 11 U. S. C. § 205 (e) (Supp. 1936)].
25. Although doubts have been expressed, the provision is generally believed to be
constitutional. Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935), cert.
denied, 296 U. S. 581 (1936); see 1 GRDES. CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS § 32; 2 id.
§ 1038.
26. 1 GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS § 17; Frank, supra note 5, at 709;
Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act (1934) 48 HARV.
L. Rxv. 39, 48.
27. Note the strenuous efforts of J. P. Morgan & Company to avoid being placed
in the same class as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the Missouri Pacific
[Vol. 46: 11091114
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Under Section 77B(b) (5)28 a plan may be imposed on an entire class
despite unanimous opposition by the members of the class. This can
be accomplished in any of four ways :"- first, by transfer, sale, or re-
tention of the property subject to existing liens; second, by sale of the
property at a fair upset price with a transfer of the liens to the proceeds
of the sale; third, by appraisal and payment in cash of the value of
these liens or, at the creditors' election, of the value of the securities
awarded to these liens under the plan; or finally, by any method which
will afford adequate protection under the circumstances of the particular
case.
30
With the possible exception of the fourth alternative, the Act prob-
ably insures long term creditors a degree of protection at least as effective
as that offered them in equity reorganizations.3" But as applied to short
term secured creditors the Act has again somewhat drastically changed
reorganization practice. Before these amendments the short term pledgee-
creditor could always sell his collateral at public sale and, if necessary,
bid it in himself to hold for a possible rise in price; but he is now faced
with the. threat that his collateral may be valued during a period of
rock-bottom prices and the cash equivalent paid to him in lieu of it."
Furthermore, under the fourth alternative the court apparently has broad
and discretionary power to force upon an entire class of short or long
term creditors any plan which it thinks will "equitably and fairly protect
reorganization. It re .Missouri Pac. R. R., 13 F. Supp. 888 (E. D. Mo. 1935), aff'd, 35
F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 230 (1936).
28. BANrRuPTcY AcT § 77B (b) (5), 4S STAT. 913, 11 U. S. C. 207 (b) (5) (1934).
For the corresponding sections of the Railroad Reorganization Act see BAM-"urrcy
AcT § 77 (e), 49 STAT. 1969, 11 U. S. C. § 205 (e) (Supp. 1936).
29. As Frank points out, where several alternatives are available, the tendency will
be to select the one which is least favorable to the class or interest involved. Frank,
mspra note 5, at 708.
30. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Louisville Joint Stoc: Land Banlk
v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935), the constitutionality of the third and fourth alternative
methods presented by the statute is open to serious doubt. The fourth alternative was
in fact found unconstitutional in In re Tennessee Pub. Co., 81 F. (2d) 462 (C. C. A. 6th,
1936). aff'd on other grounds, sub norn. Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American Nat. Ban!:,
299 U. S. 18 (1936). Friendly [Amendment of the Railroad Reorganization Act (1936)
36 CoL. L. REv. 27, 35] takes the position that no creditor may be deprived of his col-
lateral, without sale, in the absence of the consent of a majority of his class, however
reasonable the substitute may be. To the contrary see Craven and Fuller, stnra note 5,
at 1276; Frank, supra note 5, at 703-10.
31. 2 GERDEs, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS § 1057. This generalization may he in-
applicable to the single mortgage creditor. Under equity and bankruptcy practice, he
might be enjoined from collecting his debt if the debtor's estate had a potential equity
in the property, but he was not reorganized out of his collateral against his will. See
note 16, supra.
32. The short term bank creditor is thus placed in a position analogous to that of
the dissenter in equity reorganizations.
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the creditor under all the circumstances of the particular case." While
experience acquired since the enactment of those amendments does not
indicate that their coercive provisions often result in serious injury to
the secured creditors,"3 the possibility of loss is sufficient to cause secured
creditors to try to withdraw from the reorganization tribunal by the
foreclosure route.
Thus, at the inception of a 77B proceeding the secured creditor may
adopt one of several courses: he may decide to participate in the reor-
ganization, despite the risk that an unfavorable plan may be imposed upon
him and that he may be injured by the delay inherent in all reorganiza-
tions, or he may choose to take no chances and decide to escape, if
possible, from this threat of coercive action by foreclosing on his col-
lateral. That the short term creditor will choose the second alternative,
if it is available, goes without saying. This decision raises two prob-
lems: first, whether the reorganization court may enjoin both the long
and short term creditor classes from foreclosing on their collateral; and
second, if such power exists, when it may be exercised. The Supreme
Court decision in the Rock Island case 34 definitely answers the first ques-
tion but leaves the second in a state of doubt and ambiguity.
Shortly after filing a petition under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,
the Rock Island Railway moved for an injunction restraining five bank
creditors and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation from selling the
securities pledged to secure their claims. The railroad owed these short
term creditors in the aggregate less than $18,500,000, and as security
for these obligations had deposited collateral of an aggregate par value
of over $54,000.000. Except for one item of $1,400,000, the collateral
was of three kinds: bonds of the debtor railroad, bonds of subsidiaries
which the debtor had guaranteed, and bonds of subsidiaries which the
debtor had not guaranteed. The District Court and the Circuit Court of
Appeals had found that the sale of this system collateral would complete-
ly prevent the preparation and consummation of a plan of reorganiza-
tion. This conclusion, which the Supreme Court accepted largely upon
the findings of the lower courts,35 was based on the contentions that the
33. In fact, the courts seem to have indicated an extremely conservative approach
to this question, and have been reluctant to approve any plan unless all classes of
secured creditors consent to it. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935) ; In re Tennessee Pub. Co., 81 F. (2d) 462 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) ; Preble Corp.
v. Wentworth. 84 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936); Francisco Building Corp. v. Batt-
son, 83 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
34. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. 1. & Pac. Ry., 294 U. S.
648 (1935).
35. Id. at 678. "These concurrent findings of the two courts, as this court has often
held, should be accepted as conclusive unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Com-
mercial Credit Co., 286 U. S. 63, 67 [1932]; Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1, 14 [1898];
Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n.. 209 U. S. 20, 23, 24 [1908]."
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sale of the collateral might precipitate similar action by creditors holding
$145,000,000 of additional system collateral, and that the sale of this
collateral from time to time during the reorganization proceedings might
require changes in details of the plan which would involve new and,
perhaps, difficult reconciliations of the views of many essentially diverse
interests and might force an abandonment of the proceedings.'G
Upon considering all the factors, the Supreme Court held that under
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act3 7 a reorganization court had power to
enjoin a short term creditor secured by a pledge of the debtor's securities.
This involved an abandonment of the long established theory that a
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction only over property in custodia legisa
such as mortgages held by long term creditors, and that in the absence
of possession, as in cases where securities were held in pledge by short
term creditors, no injunction could be issued.3" There was no express
provision in Section 77 upon which this result could be founded. But
in its desire to uphold Section 77 and promote its operation and effective-
ness, the Court found sufficient basis for the new rule in the fact that
a bankruptcy court is "a virtual court of equity," and further in the
general provisions of Section 2(15) of the Bankruptcy Act and Section
262 of the Judicial Code -neither of which had theretofore been con-
sidered available for this purpose. 0
This decision enables the reorganization court to cut off the escape
of both long and short term creditors from the delays and dangers in-
evitable in reorganization proceedings. It is a powerful weapon. If
36. It was contended that since a substantial amount of the collateral consisted of
bonds of the debtor, or bonds of the debtor's subsidiaries which the debtor had guaran-
teed, the sale of these securities would have disturbed the mechanics of the reorganiza-
tion by creating new classes of creditors and increasing the amount of claims outstand-
ing in existing classes.
37. Although the decision was based on the B.%NrmuPrcY Acr § 77, the principle
is applicable to 77B proceedings generally. In re Prudence Co., Inc., 82 F. (2d) 755
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. dcnied, 298 U. S. 685 (1936).
38. Despite the Court's holding that physical possession was unnecessary, the old
theory of custodia lcgis still perseveres. See In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F. (2d)
326, 328 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denie-d, 296 U. S. 622 (1936), where the court refused
to enjoin conditional vendors from repossessing equipment sold to the debtor. Cf. In re
Adolph Gobel, Inc., 80 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); In re Prudence Co., Inc., 82 F.
(2d) 755 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
39. The reasoning of the Court seems to cast great doubt on existing bankruptcy
and equity reorganization precedents. If under § 77 a bankruptcy court may enjoin a
pledgee where a foreclosure threatens the success of a reorganization, why cannot the
same court enjoin a pledgee Where a sale would hinder successful liquidation? That
question was specifically reserved by the Court for future determination.
40. It should also be noted that the Court considered constitutional objections to
the exercise of the power to restrain and overruled them on the ground that the remedy,
not the contract right, was being impaired. Realistic bankers may disagree. See Paton,
supra note 2, at 127.
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hastily and improvidently used, this power is capable of inflicting injuri-
ous consequences upon both creditor and debtor interests, particularly
in the field of short term finance.
As already pointed out, liquidity is the essential and predominant char-
acteristic of short term finance. If the use of injunctions becomes wide-
spread, banks and other sources of short term credit,41 faced with the
delay,"- expense and dangers of a reorganization proceeding, will avoid
making loans which may sustain a hard-hit company long enough for
it to survive a depression. 3 It follows that large railroad and industrial
corporations may be compelled to issue long term bonds during periods
of unfavorable markets at excessive discounts.4 4 In that case, the effect
would be to swell the debt structure and perhaps permanently burden
the debtor with greater fixed charges. If this avenue of temporary fi-
nancing is not available, bankruptcy would seem the only other course.
And if creditor interests become fearful of the dangers of promiscu-
ous injunctions, foreclosures will become more frequent during the crucial
period in which the debtor is striving to escape bankruptcy. Short term
creditors who might otherwise be inclined to grant debtors reasonable
indulgence, apprehensive of an unreasonable delay, will naturally rush
to foreclose whenever it becomes fairly evident that resort to the reor-
ganization or bankruptcy statutes will be made. The close relation-
ship that often exists between the borrowing corporations and their
41. Banks have been the principal source of short term credit during the depression
years. HARDY AND VINER, REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BANK CREDIT IN THE SEV-
EXTI FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT (Treas. Dep't 1935).
42. Protracted delay has been especially characteristic of the reorganization of
American railroads. Between 1894 and 1931 the average duration of the railroad receiv-
erships of roads operating more than 100 miles was in excess of 4 years, and apparently
there is not much promise that proceedings tinder § 77 will be materially expedited.
Many have been pending for over three years and none has been completed; one has
been dismissed. See 49 I. C. C., STATISTICS OF RAILWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES (1937)
S-9.
43. It seems agreed that the danger that short term creditors may not be permitted
to sell their collateral has a direct and adverse effect on the short term credit market.
Paton, supra note 2, at 126. For this reason Congress amended § 77 (j) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to deprive the court of power to enjoin the enforcement of equipment trust
obligations, which are essentially of a short term nature. The principal argument in
favor of the amendment was that it was necessary to restore the confidence of the
market in obligations of that kind. Further, in enacting § 74 of the Bankruptcy Act,
Congress limited jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of debts to cases where the
court had actual or constructive possession of the property because any other rule
would "further restrict credit." SEN. REP. No. 1215, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 5.
In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 595 (1935) Mr.
Justice Brandeis pointed out that the Frazier-Lemke Act was made inapplicable to future
mortgages for fear that the farmers' credit facilities would be destroyed. See REPORT
Or NATIONAL BANKRuPrcY CONFERENCE (1935) 35 (tentative draft).
44. DEWING, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 940.
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bankers will insure the bankers of timely .warning of the impending
event.
In addition, the participation of short term creditors in the reorgan-
ization will result in increased bankers' domination. During the reor-
ganization process this may be manifested by banker control over reor-
ganization committees45 - with a resulting increase in reorganization
fees and expenses.40 After reorganization this mastery may appear
through bank ownership of a majority 7 or a controlling minority of
the voting stock.4" In cases where creditors receive a controlling share
of the stock of the reorganized company, their desire for liquidity will
create conflicts as to the policies of the new company. A conservative
policy of quick realization of assets might fit the desires of bank credi-
tors, but other interests which have sustained a much greater loss as a
result of the failure of the enterprise, hoping for larger future gains,
will prefer to keep the corporation's property intact 0
The banker is likely to sell his block of stock in the new company at
the first favorable opportunity. This may result in a transfer of control
from the commercial banker to the investment banker and a resultant
uncertainty of policy during the early and delicate period of the new
company's existence, a development which may not be to the best inter-
ests of the minority shareholders."'
45. See Lowenthal, The Railroad Rcorganialion Act (1933) 47 HArv. L. REV. 18;
Lowenthal, The Stock Exchange and Protect've Committee Securities (1933) 33 CoL
L. Rnv. 1293.
46. Under § 77B (c) (9) the district court has discretionary power to make an
allowance out of the estate to creditors' attorneys for services rendered in the reorgani-
zation. The inclusion of pledged property in the estate undergoing reorganization in-
creases administrative costs.
47. An instance where secured bank creditors were awarded voting control of a re-
organized corporation is presented in In re Middle West Utilities Co., N. D. Ill., Nov.
27, 1935; in that case the bank creditors received 51.65% of the stock in the new company.
48. See generally Bn.E AVD 341EA%-S, THE MoDRN CoRo,*rAoN- ,ztD PnIVArz
PRoPETY (1932).
49. This problem worried the unsecured creditors and shareholders in In re Middle
West Utilities Co., N. D. Ill., Nov. 27, 1935. It was finally solved when the bank cred-
itors agreed to name only four of the nine directors during the initial term of office
and to include in the by-laws a provision that no asset having a book value in excess
of $500,000 could be sold without consent of two-thirds of the entire hoard; the con-
trolling directors were named by the court. In this manner it was hoped that the
danger of an immediate liquidation of the new company by the banking interests would
be avoided.
50. An illustration of this point is also presented by the Middle West Utilities re-
organization. Recently two investment bankers announced that they had purchased from
the Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Company 475,000 shares, constituting 14.3% of all
outstanding shares, which the bank held in the reorganized company. See N. Y. Times,
Aug. 19, 1936, p. 31, col. 5.
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Eliminating the threat of a sale of the collateral likewise removes a
powerful incentive for consummating and completing a plan. Within
the sheltering haven of an injunction, the debtor may simply wait - at
the expense of the creditor. If waiting proves the wrong policy, the
creditor loses. If conditions change for the better, the creditor is paid
off or a compromise reached -all, apparently, at the option of the
debtor. This situation results from the change in bargaining power in-
cident to the injunction. A reorganization is essentially a bargaining
process between creditors and security holders; the final plan turns
largely on the position of the respective parties. A creditor able to
foreclose has one position. A creditor unable to foreclose has another;
separated by injunction from mortgage collateral, he has almost no
bargaining power at all, and may be dealt with lightly in the timing of
the reorganization.
In short, if exercised without discrimination, the power to restrain
the enforcement of secured creditors' claims may destroy the sources of
short term credit and thereby force needy borrowers into bankruptcy;
it may precipitate foreclosures by secured creditors upon the first indi-
cation that their debtors contemplate resorting to the reorganization
statutes: it may increase reorganization costs and expenses; it may en-
hance banker-control of the reorganization and the new company; and
finally, it may remove an effective stimulus to speedy reorganization.
To avoid these consequences, it is essential that the power be sparingly
exercised.
Once it is recognized that the power to restrain the sale of collateral
should be employed with caution, the limitations beyond which the Rock
Island case should not be applied appear with greater clarity.
First, under the Rock Island case, secured creditors may be restrained
from selling their collateral "if a sale would so hinder, obstruct and
delay the preparation and consummation of a plan of reorganization as
probably to prevent it."'" Whether an injunction will be granted even
in such cases rests in the court's discretion. No distinction was made in
this respect between short term (pledgee) and long term (mortgagee)
creditors. But the Court did point out that "A claim that injurious con-
sequences will result to the pledgee or the mortgagee may not, of course,
be disregarded by the district court; but it presents a question addressed
not to the power of the court but to its discretion . . . " Thus, the
district court may take into consideration the fact that an injunction
restraining the sale of collateral securing short term debts constitutes
a much greater destruction of the creditors' expectations than an in-
51. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U. S.
648, 675 (1935).
52. Id. at 677.
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junction restraining the sale of collateral securing long term indebted-
ness. Because of this and the other considerations already mentioned,
a stronger showing may be required before the court will exercise its
discretion in the case of short term debts. While the powers of the
court are the same, whether long or short term creditors are involved,
the considerations controlling the exercise of the discretionary power
are different. And the burden of proving that the power should be
exercised clearly rests with those who desire that a restraining order be
issued or maintained.
5 3
Second, injunctions should be granted only when the threatened sale
may reasonably be expected seriously to impede or destroy the effort
to reorganize. The Rock Island case presented such a situation. The
collateral, which was worth more than the outstanding debts, consisted
almost entirely of bonds issued by the debtor or bonds of debtor's sub-
sidiaries, many of which had been guaranteed by the debtor. The sale
of this collateral might well have precipitated sales by other creditors,
and a resultant continuing fluctuation of outstanding claims. As the
court pointed out, that, in turn, "might require such change of detail in
the plan, entailing new and perhaps different reconcilements of views
among many and conflicting interests, as to force an abandonment of
the proceeding."'  A similar determination may be expected where the
collateral held by secured creditors constitutes an integral and necessary
part of the debtor's property without which the debtor cannot continue
in business; where the sale of the collateral would destroy a valuable
equity of the debtor ;r5 or where because of abnormal market conditions
the sale might result in an unreasonably large deficiency claim which
would overbalance the claims of other interests and threaten the success
of the reorganization proceedingsr '6
Third, an injunction should not be granted unless it appears that the
debtor will be reorganized within a reasonable time. Reorganization pro-
ceedings have in many cases become a haven of refuge for well-meaning
but deluded debtors for whom there is no hope of salvation. Without
any real equity in their properties, most of which are pledged or en-
cumbered by mortgages, and without profitable sources of income, they
cling to their corporate lives, hoping that a miracle may rescue them
from disaster. In other cases, the rehabilitation of the debtor can be
53. Foust v. 'Munson Steamship Lines, 299 U. S. 77 (1936); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Henwood, 86 F. (2d) 347, 354 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); In re .Murel Holding Corp.,
75 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) sonblc; In re Coney Island Hotel Corp., 76 F. (2d)
126 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) semble.
54. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U. S.
648, 679 (1935).
55. In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 77 F. (2d) 323, 331 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
56. Central States Ins. Co. v. Koplar, 80 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) smble.
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accomplished only with material concessions by shareholders or creditors
-concessions which they emphatically refuse to make." In such in-
stances it seems clear that secured creditors should not be restrained
from disposing of their collateral. The debtor and subordinate interests
may be willing "to stay under the umbrella" indefinitely, and the court,
sympathizing with the debtor's predicament, may wait patiently for better
days before terminating the reorganization proceedings and directing a
liquidation. But these visionary expectations .do not furnish the basis
for an injunction restraining the enforcement of secured creditors'
claims.58 A mere flicker of hope may be sufficient to justify the con-
tinuation of reorganization proceedings, but it hardly sustains the im-
position of a restraint upon the rights of secured creditors.-
Fourth, where the pledged or mortgaged property is worth less than
the amount of the liens on it, the sale of the property should not be
restrained unless the property is essential for the continued operation
of the debtor's business. In many cases, particularly those involving short
term creditors, the collateral consists of property which is not an in-
tegral part of the debtor's business, such as stocks, bonds, accounts re-
ceivable, or other choses in action acquired during the course of the
debtor's operations. Where the debtor has no equity in it, the sale of
the collateral would not retard or hamper the reorganization. Conse-
quently there would seem to be no basis for enjoining the sale of the
security.
Fifth, the sale of collateral should not be enjoined in cases where the
security cannot be brought within the plan of reorganization. In many
instances, secured creditors constituting more than one-third of a class
will accept a plan of reorganization deemed fair by the court only if
the collateral is surrendered to them. In these cases the court is power-
less to include the collateral in the property to be held by the reorganized
company unless the debtor or other parties to the reorganization are
willing to adopt one of the alternatives provided in Sections 77(e) or
77B(b) (5)-the transfer of the property to the reorganized company
subject to existing liens or an appraisal and payment in cash of the
value of the liens. But in most instances reorganizations cannot succeed
unless the amount of outstanding claims is reduced; retention of exist-
ing liens would frustrate the major purpose of the reorganization. Fur-
ther, generally no cash is available for the purpose of paying creditors
the full value of their liens. Thus, the alternatives presented by Section
57. Cf. In, re 235 W. 46th St. Co., Inc., 74 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; Manati
Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); In re Murel Holding Corp.,
75 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); In re Coney Island Hotel Corp., 76 F. (2d) 126
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; In re Island Park Associates, 77 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
58. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
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77B (b) (5) often will not provide a satisfactory solution where more
than one-third of a creditor class is unwilling to accept any plan of re-
organization which does not provide for the surrender of the collateral."
When an impasse develops from which the provisions of Sections
77(e) or 77B(b) (5) afford no escape, it would seem useless to restrain
creditors from enforcing their claims, for ultimately the collateral will
have to be surrendered to them. Power to restrain creditors is neces-
sarily founded upon the possibility of bringing the security within the
plan of reorganization. When that is impossible in these cases, the stay
serves a useful purpose no longer and its continuation can hardly be
justified60
It is apparent that promiscuous injunctions restraining the sale of
collateral held by short term creditors may have widespread and harm-
ful repercussions on the business of banking and finance and on sound
reorganization practice. The power should be sparingly exercised and
limited to reorganizations in which injunctions are clearly necessary to
promote the common good. Each case must stand on its own bottom;
but certain general rules and principles suggest themselves. If adapted
to the special needs of the individual reorganization, the rules should
result in a satisfactory adjustment of the conflicting interests of secured
creditors on the one hand, and the debtor, its shareholders and subor-
dinate creditors on the other.
59. A third alternative may be presented by §§ 77 (e) and 77B (b) (5) (d) ; under
these sections it can be argued that the reorganization court may impose a fair and
equitable plan upon an entire dissenting class. But there is considerable doubt whether
this power exists and whether it is constitutional. See note 28. supra.
60. Cf. Ii; re Coney Island Hotel Corp., 76 F. (2d) 126 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; In re
Commonwealth Bond Corp., 77 F. (2d) 308, 309 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
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